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BOOK REVIEWS
THE MORAL DECISION:

RIGHT AND WRON4G IN THE LIGHT OF

By Edmond Cahn. 'Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955. Pp. ix, 342. $5.00.
AMERICAN LAW.

There are still far too many-among lawyers and laymen alikewho believe that legal philosophy-the study of relationships between
law and the basic principles of life-is a matter of preoccupation for the
few, the learned and the abstruse. The lamentable place that the teaching- of jurisprudence still occupies in the American law schools shows
how great the contempt of the so-called practical lawyer is for such
apparent luxuries.
Professor Edmond Cahn has for years been one of those who not
only have energetically fought against this dangerous and damaging belief, but who, by a combination of strong convictions, deep learning, and
felicity of expression have been able to carry this message to wider
circles. The Sense of Injustice, published in 1949, was an important
event in the literature of jurisprudence. However it still suffered from
a certain tenseness of presentation, and the frequent use of allegorical
language made the book difficult for the uninitiated. The Moral Decision is a far more relaxed and, therefore, far more generally accessible
book, though this does not detract from either its importance or its depth
of thinking. This book is an attempt to assess the influence that the
moral sense, the standards and the consciousness of right and wrong,
have in the making and application of American law. The juxtaposition
of these often antithetic concepts, "making and application," is deliberate.
For it is in the application of moral judgment to the borderline situation
that judges and administrators make law while applying it.
In the introductory part, Professor Cahn disposes of some still current heresies. Among them is the belief, prevalent among earlier philosophers such as Kant, that morality is a matter of inner conscience, and
law a matter of outward behavior. Another is that law is not concerned
with moral standards except in a very remote way. Professor Cahn
shows-and in this he is in accord with prevalent contemporary legal
thought-that in our times the share of law-making in the development
of moral standards is far greater than at any previous time. There is a
constant interaction, a give-and-take between moral standards that influence the law, and legislative standards that shape morality. .
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The main, and the most fascinating, part of the book is devoted to
a discussion of a number of selected cases, ranging over different fields
of the law, which raise moral problems of outstanding significance. The
cases chosen are grouped around six major problems: the value of life;
sexual relationships; the conduct of business; business with Government; the enlargement of personality; life and death (called by the author
"the last of life"). The treatment of the author is that of a composer
who sets a theme and paraphrases it in a number of variations. The
mood of these variations ranges from that of the last movement of the
Appasionata to that of the intensely reflective slow movements of Beethoven's lhst sonatas. On some of the issues raised Professor Cahn feels
very strongly indeed; on others he raises doubts, pondering conflicting
values, but hardly ever leaving the reader in a position where he could
not make up his mind one way or another.
It is not always clear whether Professor Cahn's conclusions on the
solution of a case are of the moral or the legal order-granted that the
distinction is never more than a relative one. For example, in discussing
the strikingly parallel American and English cases where survivors on a
wreck had to choose between a common death and self-preservation by
the killing of some of the survivors, he ends in the following manner:
I am driven to conclude that otherwise-that is, if none
sacrifice themselves of free will to spare the others-they must
all wait and die together. For where all have become congeners,
pure and simple, no one can save himself by killing another.
In such a setting and at such a price, he has no moral individuality left to save. Under the terms of the moral constitution, it will be wholly his self that he kills in his vain effort to
preserve himself. The "morals of the last days" leave him a
generic creature only; in such a setting, so remote from the
differentiations of normal existence, every person in the boat
embodies the entire genus. Whoever saves one, saves the whole
human race; whoever kills one, kills mankind.
So, in all humility, I would put aside the talk of casting
lots, not only because the crisis involves stakes too high for
gambling and responsibilities too deep for destiny, but also because no one can win in such a lottery, no one can survive intact
by means of the killing.'
Presumably Professor Cahn's conclusion is that the conviction for murder of those who took part in the killing of some of the survivors was
1. P. 71.
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justified. Implicit in this evaluation is the moral philosophy that the
struggle for self-preservation, involving in times of emergency the survival of some at the expense of others, is not the supreme value in contemporary American (and English) law. The survivors have become
part of a community of necessity and fate, much like those who fight
in battle or together face a bombing raid.
The author's strongest, and most eloquently expressed, convictions
are reserved to the field of marriage and other sexual relationships.
There is no doubt where he stands. He emphatically endorses, though in
far more vivid language, the decision of the House of Lords in Baxter v.
Baxter.2 The procreation of children is not a necessary, though an important, part of the marriage relationship, so that insistence on the use
of contraceptives is not refusal to consummate, nullifying the marriage.
This, of course, is deeply controversial among lawyers and others, largely
according to their religious persuasion. To Professor Cahn, the insistence on procreation as the essential purpose of marriage is a "studfarm
philosophy," the treatment of a prospective wife as a foaling mare. And
what Professor Cahn says about this particular aspect of the marriage
permeates his whole attitude towards the infinitely complex and delicate
adventure that is marriage, as well as his attitude towards children (he
is emphatically in favor of treating trespassing children as entitled to
recovery for damages suffered by attractive traps). He strongly, and
rightly, attacks the surviving statutes in the law of some American
States which purport to condemn "fornication" and mostly lie buried
until they are unearthed to justify some act of discrimination or vindictiveness.
It is welcome, too, that Professor Cahn, a practical tax lawyer of
experience and note, has no sympathy with the widely held and occasionally judicially favored view that the citizens should cheat the Government of taxes as far as they possibly can. In this, one of the most convincing of his discussions, Professor Cahn clearly disagrees, as on other
occasions, with Judge Learned Hand who said: "I could wish that it
was commonly thought more morally shameful than it is to evade
taxes.. . . [W] e must try to appraise the moral repugnance of the ordinary man towards the conduct in question; not what an ideal citizen
would feel." 3
The subject of a concluding discussion on the mind of the judge is
the question of the "common conscience," and in particular a conflict of
opinion between Judge Hand and Judge Frank. In the celebrated case
2. [1948] A.C. 247.
3. United States ex rel. Berlandi v. Reimer, 113 F.2d 429, 431 (2d Cir. 1940).
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of R. v. United States4 the question was whether the petitioner for
naturalization who, some years earlier, had deliberately put his thirteenyear-old son to death, should be granted his petition. The petitioner, a
dutiful father with several normal children, lovingly cared for, had killed
the child because it had "suffered from birth from a brain injury which
destined him to be an idiot and a physical monstrosity malformed in all
four limbs. The child was blind, mute, and deformed. He had to be
fed.; the movements of his bladder and bowels were involuntary, and his
entire life was spent in a small crib." The answer to this problem will,
of course, again divide people according to their religious convictions
about the sanctity of life in relation to other values. What Professor
Cahn is concerned with, is the skeptical view of Judge Hand, who despaired of any reliable test to ascertain what, in a given instance, the
"common conscience" demanded. In contrast, Judge Frank contended
that if community opinion was to be decisive in a particular case, the
case should be remanded to the trial judge, under directions to receive
additional evidence as to what the community thought. Professor Cahn
does not share Judge Hand's pessimism, but neither does he appear to
share Judge Frank's belief that a question of this kind can be solved by
a kind of Gallup Poll evidence.
In the present reviewer's respectful opinion, there is no doubt that
the task of choosing between conflicting moral values need not be left to
the purely subjective discretion of the judge in a particular case. There
must be, and there are, objective tests. They cannot, however, be sought
solely or even predominantly in statistics, a view with which Professor
Cahn agrees, or in any single criterion. The present reviewer has attempted elsewhere5 to indicate some of the ways in which this complex
problem could be solved. What the prevalent moral standards of a community are at a given time can seldom be answered with complete certainty. But the problem can usually be narrowed down to a choice between fairly clearly defined alternatives. One hundred years ago, or
even thirty years ago, collective agreements, for example, were still
widely regarded as an improper derogation of freedom of contract. Today, such a view would be untenable in any civilized country. Fifty
years ago, the married woman was still in many respects a chattel,
greatly inferior in legal status to the husband. Again, such a view could
not be defended by an English, American, or German court today, in the
light of clearly ascertainable trends of legislation. Nor would it be
tenable any longer to regard economic activities of governments as "non4. 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
5. LEGAL THEORY, c. 23 (3d ed. 1953).
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governmental." 6 As regards the validity of blood group tests, science
has progressed sufficiently in the last quarter of a century to make at
least a negative proof of parenthood by this means a clearly reliable judicial test. Again, suicide is a crime, in theory; some judges still will regard it substantively as a crime, because of their religious beliefs. But
clearly any judge would be justified today not to regard suicide as an
impairment of moral character in view of the whole trend of judicial
practice and public opinion that has made the crime a fictitious one. But
there remain fields in which the stark choice between conflicting ultimate
beliefs cannot be avoided, because the community itself is deeply divided.
Neither the advanced views of a minority, nor the backward-looking
views of another minority, can furnish the test. The judge cannot be a
revolutionary when he interprets the law. Euthanasia, for example,
would still have to be regarded as a crime where a conviction for murder
is at issue. But where a free evaluation of moral character for another
purpose, such as naturalization, is in question, the judge is clearly entitled to choose as best he can between conflicting views on euthanasia
that are held with equal fervor and moral seriousness by different sections of the community. That is why, in this particular case, Judge
Frank's recommendation would not presumably have led to any clearly
ascertainable result, and Judge Hand's view was probably right in the
circumstances (though not as a general maxim).
It goes without saying that the selection of problems is very far
from exhausting the field of moral decisions in relation to the law. It is
greatly to be hoped that Professor Calm will continue the present book,
much as A. P. Herbert has added from time to time to his Uncommon
Law or Misleading Cases. Among the areas which the present reviewer
would recommend to the author's attention, would be the infinitely complex but important problem of competition and cooperation as reflected
in American anti-trust law. The philosophy of free enterprise and free
competition is usually taken as a gospel, and few are willing to test it on
its own premises as well as in relation to the equally important principle
of cooperation. This whole matter now gains added significance, because of the international impact of American anti-trust and American
investment policy. Few could help as much in clear and fearless thinking on this as on many other subjects as the author of this wise and important book.
W. FRIEDMANNt
6. Cf., e.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).

t Professor of Law and Director of International Legal Research, Columbia Uni-
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